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November 19, 2024 marked 1000 days since Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine.[1] There is an ongoing debate as to whether the invasion can be classified as a crime of aggression.[2] United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 3314 defines aggression as “the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations, as set out in this Definition.”[3] Article 3 of this resolution outlines specific acts that constitute acts of aggression per se.[4] Russia's February 2022 invasion of Ukraine can be characterized as many of the per se acts of aggression, and thus can be considered a crime of aggression.
The first prohibited act is “[t]he invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of another State, or any military occupation, however temporary, resulting from such invasion or attack, or any annexation by the use of force of the territory of another State or part thereof.”[5] This is evident by the fact that Russia breached Ukraine’s borders, sending more than one hundred thousand troops in February 2022.[6] By sending its military within the borders of Ukraine and directing military attacks, Russia has engaged in an act of aggression.
The second act of aggression is the bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory of another State or the use of any weapons by a State against the territory of another State.[7] This applies in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, as there has been constant bombardment of Ukraine. For example, in September 2022, Russia started using aerial bombs and now 3,000 aerial bombs are used each month to target areas close to the frontline.[8] Furthermore, on November 17, 2024, Russia launched 120 missiles and 90 drones into Ukraine, targeting power infrastructure and killing civilians.[9]
The third act of aggression is the blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of another State.[10] In February 2022, Russian vessels surrounded Ukraine’s Black Sea ports and laid mines across trade routes,[11] thereby cutting off Ukraine’s ability to export and trade via the sea. After a few days of the invasion, the number of commercial vessels dropped from 150 daily to nearly 0.[12] Similarly, the fourth act is an attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air forces, or marine and air fleets of another State.[13] For example, since 2022, a total of 5,762 Ukrainian military equipment and vehicles were destroyed, including 41 naval ships.[14] Thus, Russia’s invasion constitutes a crime of aggression under the third and fourth acts of aggression.
The fifth act is “the use of armed forces of one State which are within the territory of another State with the agreement of the receiving State, in contravention of the conditions provided for in the agreement or any extension of their presence in such territory beyond the termination of the agreement.”[15] In other words, this is when two countries have a treaty and another breaches it by acting outside of the agreed conditions. In 1997, Russia signed a bilateral treaty with Ukraine allowing it to station troops at its naval base in Sevastopol, Crimea in exchange for respecting Ukrainian sovereignty.[16] However, in early 2014, Russia used these troops to occupy Crimea, seizing public buildings and military facilities.[17] This action breached the bilateral treaty, thereby disrespecting Ukrainian sovereignty with the use of Russia’s military, constituting another act of aggression.
The sixth act is “[t]he action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at the disposal of another State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating an act of aggression against a third State.”[18] Belarus has supported Russia’s actions by allowing Russia to launch attacks from its territory,[19] as well as becoming a training ground for the Wagner Group, a Russian paramilitary organization.[20] In connection with this, the final listed prohibited act of aggression is “the sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial involvement therein.”[21] The Wagner Group is involved in the fighting in Ukraine and, according to Ukrainian prosecutors, killed and tortured civilians in Kyiv in April 2022.[22] Thus, Belarus’ support of Russia qualifies as an act of aggression.
Russia may argue that the invasion was not a crime of aggression because it took military action to stop the genocide of Russian-speaking civilians in Ukraine’s Donbas region.[23] In 2014, Russia framed its annexation of Crimea as humanitarian intervention.[24] Under the
Responsibility to Protect doctrine (R2P), states are responsible for protecting their citizens from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.[25] Thus, Russia attempted to justify their invasion on humanitarian grounds. In order to bolster its claim of genocide, Russia has reported statistics of deaths yet many observers have found these figures to be fabricated.[26]
Moreover, even if conditions trigger the responsibility to protect, it does not authorize unilateral use of force, as it goes against Article 2(4) of the UN charter.[27] This provision encourages states to implement R2P through nonviolent means such as diplomacy. According to Article 51 of the UN charter, there are three exceptions for unilateral use of force which are are self-defense, authorization from the security council, and consent from the state that is being invaded.[28] First, Russia does not meet the criteria for self-defense because Ukraine did not attack or threaten to attack Russia or any other UN member state.[29] Second, there was no security authorization, as the UN security council condemned Russia’s invasion as illegal.[30] Finally, Ukraine did not consent. Thus, Russia's invasion of Ukraine is still a crime of aggression because it is not a use of force that is made permissible by these exceptions.
Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine can be classified as a crime of aggression under United General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 3314. Even though Russia may argue that it was acting in defense of Russian-speaking civilians in Ukraine, its actions do not fall under the exceptions necessary for unilateral use of force.
Karen Glikman is a Staff Editor for CICLR Volume 8.
[1] 1,000 days of Russia’s full-scale war on Ukraine: 5 facts you need to know, European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (Nov. 19, 2024),
[2] Patrick Butchard, Conflict in Ukraine: A Special Tribunal on the Crime of Aggression, HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY
(Aug. 27 2024), https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9968/.
[3] G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX) art. I.
[4] G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX) art. III.
[5] Id. at ¶ 1.
[6] Noah Berman & Mariel Ferragamo, How Ukraine Overcame Russias Grain Blockade, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Feb. 27, 2024, 6:49 PM), https://www.cfr.org/article/how-ukraine-overcame-russias-grain-blockade.
[7] G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), art. 3 ¶ 2.
[8] Olha Polishchuk and Cristian Vlas, Ukraine War Situation Update: 26 October – 1 November 2024, ARMED
CONFLICT LOCATION & EVENT DATA,
[9] Russia launches massive missile and drone attack at Ukraine's infrastructure, CBS NEWS (Nov. 17 2024, 8:34 PM) https://www.cbsnews.com/news/russia-massive-missile-drone-attack-ukraine-infrastructure/.
[10] G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), art. 3 ¶ 3.
[12] Id.
[13] G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), art. 3 ¶ 4.
[14] Jakub Janovsky, Naalsio26, Aloha, Dan, Kemal & Alexander Black, Attack On Europe: Documenting Ukrainian Equipment Losses During The Russian Invasion Of Ukraine, ORYX (Feb. 24, 2022) https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-ukrainian.html?m=1.
[15] G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), art. 3 ¶ 5.
[16] Spencer Kimball, Bound by Treaty, DEUTSCHE WELLE (March 11, 2014) https://www.dw.com/en/bound-by-treaty-russia-ukraine-and-crimea/a-17487632.
[17] Takeover: The Russian Occupation of Crimea, 10 Years Ago, RADIO FREE EUROPE (March 13 2024, 10:26 AM) https://www.rferl.org/a/crimea-annexation-russia-ukraine-2014-ten-years/32860172.html.
[18] G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), art. 3 ¶ 6.
[19] Jonathan Masters, The Belarus-Russia Alliance: An Axis of Autocracy in Eastern Europe, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Sep. 27, 2023, 6:49 PM), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/belarus-russia-alliance-axis-autocracy-eastern-europe.
[20] What is Russia's Wagner group, and what has happened to its leader?, BBC (Sept. 6 2023), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-60947877.
[21] G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), art. 3 ¶ 7.
[22] Russia's Wagner group, BBC, supra note 20.
[23] Putin’s Claims That Ukraine is Committing Genocide are Baseless, but not Unprecedented, THE CONVERSATION,
(Feb. 25, 2022, 5:02 PM), https://theconversation.com/putins-claims-that-ukraine-is-committing-genocide-are-baseless-but-not-unprecedented-177511.
[24] Id.
[25] About the Responsibility to Protect, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON GENOCIDE PREVENTION AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO
PROTECT, https://www.un.org/en/genocide-prevention/responsibility-protect/about#:~:text=Paragraphs%20on%20the
%20Responsibility%20to%20Protect&text=Each%20individual%20State%20has%20the,through%20appropriate%2and%20necessary%20means (last visited Nov. 20, 2024).
[26] Putin’s Claims, THE CONVERSATION, supra note 23.
[27] John B. Bellinger III, How Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine Violates International Law, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Feb. 28, 2022, 2:25 PM),
[28] U.N. Charter art. 51.
[29] Bellinger, supra note 27.
[30] Butchard, supra note 2.
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