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The disparity in treatment between Ukrainian and Syrian refugees has raised important questions about the consistency and fairness of international refugee protection frameworks. While both the European Union (EU) and United States have established comprehensive legal mechanisms for processing asylum seekers, their practical application reveals concerning inconsistencies in how different refugee populations are treated. This analysis examines these disparities and their implications for international refugee law.
Both the EU and U.S. refugee systems are built upon the foundation of the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees[1] and its 1967 Protocol[2], which define a refugee as someone who is unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin “owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion.”[3] However, the implementation of these mandates varies significantly between the U.S. and EU.
The EU operates under the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), a legal and policy framework developed to guarantee uniform standards for people seeking international protection in the EU.[4] In 2013, the EU implemented the Dublin Regulation to establish criteria and mechanisms for determining member state responsibility to asylum seekers and to clarify the rules governing the relations between member states.[5] The Dublin Regulation created a system to detect early problems in national asylum or reception systems and address their root causes before they develop into fully-fledged crises.[6]
In contrast, the U.S. Congress enacted the Refugee Act of 1980 to provide “a permanent and systematic procedure for the admission of refugees of special humanitarian concern to the United States and to provide comprehensive and uniform provisions for the effective resettlement and absorption of those refugees who are admitted.”[7] The Act raised the annual ceiling for refugees, created a process for reviewing and adjusting the refugee ceiling to meet emergencies, and required annual consultation between Congress and the President.[8] The Act gave rise to the creation of the United States Refugee Admission Program (USRAP), an interagency effort to accept referrals for refugees determined to be particularly vulnerable and in need of the protection provided by third-country resettlement.[9]
The contrasting responses to the Syrian and Ukrainian refugee crises highlight how geopolitical factors and public sentiment can influence the interpretation and application of these legal frameworks.
When Syrian refugees began fleeing civil war in 2011, both the EU and U.S. demonstrated reluctance in their initial responses. While the EU eventually accepted significant numbers of Syrian refugees due to the geographic proximity, internal political tensions led to the suspension of the Dublin Regulation by member states and resistance to proposed mandatory quotas.[10] The U.S. maintained notably low admission numbers, accepting only about 22,138 Syrian refugees over about a decade under the Obama Administration.[11] This restrictive approach intensified under the Trump Administration, which implemented travel bans targeting Muslim-majority countries, including Syria.[12]
The response to Ukrainian refugees in the wake of the 2022 Russian invasion presents a stark contrast. The EU swiftly activated its Temporary Protection Directive to provide “immediate collective protection to displaced persons from the Ukraine, to alleviate pressures on national asylum systems in the EU and to allow displaced persons to enjoy harmonized rights across the EU.”[13] Member states went beyond minimum requirements, offering housing and financial support to cover basic needs.[14] Similarly, the United States committed to accepting 100,000 Ukrainian refugees and established "Uniting for Ukraine," a streamlined process for entry to provide Ukrainians opportunities to come to the U.S. by expanding referral mechanisms to those who require permanent resettlement and broadening access to visa processing at consular posts.[15]
Several factors contribute to these divergent responses. The Russian invasion of Ukraine was perceived as a direct threat to European security, while the Syrian conflict was viewed as a more distant crisis for western member states.[16] This perception influenced political will and resource allocation in both regions. Some EU member states even used the Syrian refugee crisis for political gain, with leaders like Poland's Jarosław Kaczyński and Slovakia's Robert Fico explicitly opposing Syrian refugee resettlement during election campaigns.[17]
Public opinion polls revealed troubling disparities in support for different refugee populations. In the U.S., 78% of the public approved accepting 100,000 Ukrainian refugees, compared to only 37% supporting admission of 10,000 Syrian refugees.[18] This disparity suggests that cultural and ethnic similarities may influence public support for refugee protection. The prevalence of anti-Muslim sentiment and xenophobia has particularly impacted the response to Syrian refugees, with some politicians actively exploiting these fears to block support initiatives.[19]
The inconsistent application of refugee protections has real consequences for displaced populations. Syrian refugees faced additional barriers including visa restrictions, stringent border controls, and “hostile environment” policies designed to discourage asylum seekers.[20] In contrast, Ukrainian refugees received visa-free travel and were exempt from many standard asylum requirements, including the Dublin Regulation's requirement to remain in their country of first arrival.[21]
The stark contrast in treatment between Syrian and Ukrainian refugees reveals deeply concerning inconsistencies in how international refugee protection frameworks are applied. These disparities, driven by geopolitical considerations and cultural biases, undermine the fundamental principle of refugee protection based on humanitarian need. As the international community continues to face refugee crises, it must confront and address these systemic inequities to ensure fair and consistent protection for all displaced persons, regardless of their origin or ethnicity.
Jensen Bee is a Staff Editor at CICLR.
[1] Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1, Jul. 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137.
[2] Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1, Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267.
[3] Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 1.
[4] The Common European Asylum System and Current Issues, Eur. Union Agency for Asylum (last visited Sept. 14, 2024), https://euaa.europa.eu/asylum-report-2020/21-common-european-asylum-system-and-current-issues [https://perma.cc/6G2M-2284].
[5] Council Regulation 604/2013, art. 1, 2013 O.J. (L 180) 31 (EC).
[6] Common European Asylum System, European Union (last visited Sept. 14, 2024), https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/migration-and-asylum/common-european-asylum-system_en [https://perma.cc/X8YH-EXEQ].
[7] Refugee Act of 1980, 8 U.S.C. 1521 (1980).
[8] Id.
[9] U.S. Refugee Admissions Program, U.S. Dep’t of State (last visited Sept. 13, 2024), https://www.state.gov/refugee-admissions/ [https://perma.cc/PYA7-PFZL].
[10] Will Jones, Alexander Teytelboym & Dalibor Rohac, Europe’s Refugee Crisis: Pressure Points and Solutions, Am. Enter. Inst. 1, 3 (2017).
[11] Jessica Doumit, The Syrian Refugee Crisis, Ten Years Later: How the United States Can Improve its Response, 35 Geo. Immigr. L. J. 679, 682 (2021).
[12] Id.
[13] Bernd Parusel and Valeriia Varfolomieieva, The Ukrainian Refugee Situation: Lessons for EU Asylum Policy, 16 Swedish Inst. for European Pol‘y. Stud. 1, 2 (2022).
[14] Id.
[15] Tazreena Sajjad, Hierarchies of Compassion: The Ukrainian Refugee Crisis and the United States’s Response, 23 Geo. J. Int‘l. Affs. 191, 194-95 (2022).
[16] Parusel and Varfolomieieva, supra note 13, at 9.
[17] Jones, Teytelboym & Rohac, supra note 10, at 5.
[18] Sajjad, supra note 15, at 196.
[19] Carolina Romero, Analyzing the United States’ Limited Response to the Syrian Refugee Crisis, 20 Pol. Analysis 31, 38 (2019).
[20] Parusel and Varfolomieieva, supra note 13, at 7.
[21] Id.
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